ers, they did not suffer great revenue losses, because the price declines were offset by their output increases. But with oil prices as low as $12 a barrel, their revenue would also decline, so that they can be expected to restrict output at that price, even unilaterally. I expect, therefore, that OPEC's August 1986 agreement in Geneva to restrict output will be successful. By no means does the 1986 price collapse represent the death of OPEC, as has often been proclaimed.
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rapidly before the 1973-74 price increase, grew much less rapidly during 1973-78. It then fell by about 10 percent during 1979-83 and has grown only slightly since. The OECD had both the biggest demand growth before 1973 and the biggest declines after the two price increases. Demand in the Soviet Union and in the rest of the world also increased rapidly before 1973 and has continued to increase since, although at a slower pace. 
Review of Expert Opinion, 1973-85
When oil prices collapsed in 1986, it was not the first time that the world oil market had surprised most observers. It is instructive to review how well the experts have kept pace with the market since 1973.6
ANALYSES DURING 1973-78
In 1973-74 many experts believed that OPEC had blundered by raising its price to an unsustainably high level and that it was pricing itself out of the market. Milton Friedman presented an extreme version of this view in March 1974: "In order to keep prices up, the Arabs would have to curtail their output by ever larger amounts. But even if they cut their output to zero, they could not for long keep the world price of crude at $10.00 a barrel."7 Yet, as the analytic work of 1974-75 appeared, much of it concluded that the pre-1973 price had been unsustainably low. But, overestimating both the adjustment speed of demand and the increase in non-OPEC supply in response to higher prices, it also concluded that the 1975 price was too high for OPEC's long-run interest and that some downward adjustment would be necessary.8
In 1976-78, the demand for OPEC oil recovered from its 1974-75 decline. There had been little non-OPEC supply response to higher prices, and world oil demand had resumed its growth, although at a diminished rate. Most observers had come to view the 1973-74 price increase as sustainable, but as a one-time event, corresponding to OPEC's successful cartelization of the world oil market. Henceforth, price was expected to rise only gradually, up to the "backstop" cost of alternative energy sources.9 But some analysts, most notably the Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES), argued in 1977-78 that price was unsustainably low. They concluded that if the real price were held constant through the 1980s, projected oil demand would exceed the likely supply.1I The abrupt 1979-80 price doubling clearly came as a surprise. Few observers had anticipated another price increase, especially one so large. In less than a decade, OPEC had increased the real price fivefold. These were heady times for OPEC, as Fereidun Fesharaki wrote in 1981, "As to the extent of the price increases [ in the 1980s], one can only say with certainty that real prices will not be allowed to decline again. ... On the price front, price unity seems to have permanently disappeared. OPEC feels no need for it anymore. . . Real prices are expected to rise by three to ten percent per annum during the 1980's, at irregular intervals." 12 It now seems clear that OPEC overshot the mark with its 1979-80 price doubling. Groping for an "optimal" price, OPEC misinterpreted the spot market price as a good indicator of a long-term equilibrium price. It raised its contract price too much and too rapidly. 13 During 1980-81, the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) of Stanford University conducted a controlled comparison of ten prominent models of the international oil market. 1 Most of the models were simulation models, in which OPEC set price according to some target-capacityutilization pricing rule. In only one of the models did OPEC act as an intertemporal wealth-maximizing price-setter. 16 In one model OPEC capacity was endogenous; the rest assumed that OPEC capacity was constant at 34 million bpd. In all models OPEC acted as the residual supplier, producing the difference between world oil demand and non-OPEC supply.
The EMF study remains one of the most useful pieces of work in this area. It made standardized assumptions for a variety of parameter values, such as economic growth rates, the size of the resource base for conventional oil, the cost of alternative energy sources, OPEC capacity, and the responsiveness of oil demand to changes in price and in economic growth. For each of twelve "scenarios" (each defined by a given set of assumptions about the world oil market), the models generated their respective projections.
The study's long-run conclusions about world oil prices were fairly pessimistic: in none of the models under any of the scenarios were world oil prices lower in the year 2000 than they were in 1980; in most, prices were considerably higher. As the final report concluded, "While there remains a high degree of uncertainty about future world oil prices, our analysis suggests that most of this uncertainty concerns not whether real prices will rise during the next several decades but rather how rapidly they will rise. . . . We expect a soft oil market during the first half of the decade unless another supply disruption occurs, but by 1990 real prices can be expected to exceed their current high levels." 17 But even with a large number of standardized parameter assumptions, the range of price projections from different models for a given scenario is striking. For a typical scenario, the range of prices projected for the year 2000 was between $40 a barrel and $80 a barrel (in 1981 dollars). The accuracy of the EMF study's short-term projections can be evaluated by comparing the projections for 1980-85 with actual prices, output, and demand. The appropriate EMF scenario is the low economic growth scenario, which assumed annual growth rates of about 2.3 percent.18 Of the ten models only Choucri's projected declines in the demand for OPEC oil comparable to the actual 12 million bpd drop. While a few models projected declines in world oil demand comparable to the actual decline of 5-7 million bpd, only Choucri also projected significant non-OPEC oil production increases. Most of the models projected constant or increasing prices. Only three of the ten models projected price declines, and all three predictions were less than half the actual decline through 1985.19 Virtually all the EMF models underestimated the declining demand for OPEC oil during 1980-85. All but one of the models were too pessimistic about the near-term possibilities for increasing non-OPEC production: even with constant or higher prices, few models showed increases.20 Misjudgments by individual modelers about non-OPEC supply increases were compounded by underestimates in the EMF standardized assumptions about price-responsiveness of world oil demand and about the amount of lagged responsiveness to the 1973-74 price increases still to come.
But the failure of the EMF models to project declining prices during an annual rate of 0.7 percent. Within the developing countries, demand is projected to continue to grow at a moderate rate. But it is expected to ,grow very slowly in the centrally planned economies and to decline slightly in the OECD. The region with the widest range of oil demand projections is non-OPEC developing countries. Output in the centrally planned economies and in the OECD is expected to be fairly flat. Declines in U.S. output would be offset by increases elsewhere in the OECD. In the non-OPEC developing countries output is expected to double, although there is a wide range of projections, which suggests uncertainty about their resource base. The residual supplier will continue to be OPEC, whose production is expected to increase significantly by 2000, to slightly above its 1980 value of some 30 million bpd, or 50 percent higher than its 1985 output level. There is also a wide range of projections for OPEC output, but the uncertainty is about their price and output decisions, rather than about their resource base. 24. The distribution is sawtoothed, rather than smooth, because a relatively small number of parameter cases were considered. As the number and variety of cases increased, the distribution would become smoother.
25. There is no conclusive evidence to support the view that inventories were destabilizing during the price collapse. (In 1979-80 , during the Iranian revolution, oil future about which the Saudis had warned their partners became a dire reality. Although the revenue of the Saudis has been relatively unaffected by the price decreases, the revenue of other OPEC members has been greatly reduced.
As long as the price cuts are not carried too far, they offer longerterm benefits for Saudi revenue and for the credibility of any future Saudi threats to increase output. Because of the Saudis' huge oil reserves, they inventories were built up at tne rate of 1-2 million bpd. This aggravated the market tightness and drove spot prices and contract prices higher than they would have gone otherwise.) Total OECD inventory from August 1985 through February 1986 was being built up slightly, by about 7 percent, the reverse of normal seasonal drawdown patterns. Such behavior would tend to slow the rate of price decrease, rather than accelerate it. However, one factor complicating the analysis was the adoption of "netback" pricing by many OPEC countries in the last quarter of 1985. Under this scheme the price of crude oil was determined by the prices at which the products were sold, plus some guaranteed markup for the refiners. The shift to this type of pricing scheme would have had a positive effect upon inventories of both crude oil and refined products. a. In the four simulations price is determined by OPEC at one of the three initial prices in 1986 and remains at that level until the demand for OPEC oil reaches the assumed output ceiling (25 million bpd or 35 million bpd), after which the market-clearing price is calculated.
The revenue implications of these cases help us understand what happened in 1986. As figure 10 shows, the Core's 1986 revenue is not much affected whether price is $26 or $18. But if price falls to $10 the Core's 1986 revenue falls significantly, by almost 20 percent. In the short run, therefore, the Core faces a demand curve for its oil with a price elasticity about equal to unity, at least down to a price of $18: output increases are offset almost exactly by price declines, so that revenue is constant. But for a further price decline to $ 10, it faces an inelastic shortrun demand curve: price falls and revenue decreases. Over the entire range from $26 down to $10, however, the short-run demand curve is inelastic for the rest of OPEC and for OPEC as a whole: the lower the price, the lower is their 1986 revenue.
As figure 10 shows, the constant $26 price yields the Core lower 
The Outlook
The July 1986 crude oil price of $12 a barrel was clearly an overcorrection of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 price increases and could not be sustained long. With oil at that price, Saudi Arabia and its allies would suffer revenue losses, even at the increased production levels that precipitated the price collapse. The Saudis thus had every incentive to cut their own output, even unilaterally. The fact that they could get the rest of OPEC to agree to cut back too made a price increase that much more inevitable.
Although OPEC will continue to have difficulty in getting its mlembers to honor their output quotas, it ought to be easier than it was in the past. With the 1986 price collapse so fresh in mind, Saudi threats to increase output once again will have to be taken seriously. As Samuel Johnson observed about the prospect of being hanged in a fortnight, the idea of $8 oil concentrates the mind wonderfully. This 1986 price collapse and its "lessons" for the rest of OPEC could well provide the same type of folk memory within OPEC as did the 1930 experience of 10-cent oil in East Texas for American oilmen.
But it is not just OPEC's painful memory of 1986 that guarantees that oil prices will go up. There have been no changes in the world oil market fundamental enough to sustain an oil price of $12 a barrel. Although non-OPEC oil production has increased by more than 50 percent since 1973, it appears to be within 10 percent of its peak level. The world's proved oil reserves have not increased substantially, despite an enormous amount of exploration, and OPEC's share of world oil reserves has not changed. Despite a great deal of research and development, there is still no alternative energy source that is cheap, clean, and plentiful. Perhaps the most encouraging alternative would be natural gas. Oil In the "low-demand specification" a twenty-year period for adjustment to past price increases is assumed; the estimated income elasticity is 0.77. In the "high-demand specification" a ten-year adjustment period is assumed; the estimated income elasticity is 1.0. The two specifications have basically the same lagged-price coefficients for the first ten years. The conclusion to be drawn is moderately sobering: unless one assumes that the period of lagged adjustment is much longer than ten years and that there is still to come a significant lagged response to the 1973-74 and 1979-80 price increases, there is not much time series evidence for the optimistic view that demand is highly responsive to price.
How soon can we expect price to return to the level of 1985 or 1980? Briefly, when market conditions and OPEC capacity utilization warrant. Price could return to its 1985 level within one to five years, to its 1980 level within five to ten years, perhaps longer. Once non-OPEC supply has clearly peaked, price can be expected to increase much more rapidly. And with a major disruption, price could rise to those levels within weeks. With oil prices, there is unavoidable uncertainty, the range of 43 . See Gately and Rappoport, "The Adjustment of US Oil Demand." 44. Taking account of the 1986 price decline would, of course, make demand grow even more rapidly.
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which is well captured in figure 7 above, with a little stretching of the price distributions downward.
Assuming that the demand for OPEC oil increases to 22-24 million bpd within the next few years, how will OPEC respond? In the 1990s, will it continue increasing output above 25-27 bpd, or will it keep its output below that level and let price rise? I believe it will let output expand up to about 30 million bpd, which will be a practical upper limit for OPEC. Although OPEC has the oil reserves to support a much higher level of output, perhaps as high as 45-50 million bpd, it would probably not be willing to exhaust its reserves that rapidly. Nor, probably, would the OECD countries, if blessed with some farsighted political leadership, be willing to become as dependent upon OPEC as they were in the 1970s. As Hall and Pindyck have observed, the industrialized world can have low prices or energy independence, but not both. 45 Apart from a disruption, when price rises it will probably do so gradually. Having witnessed the dangers of major, abrupt price increases forecasts are basically the same and both are on target.50 But for Italy the forecasts are not nearly as good: even with the correct assumptions, demand was overestimated by more than 10 percent; with the constant price and higher GDP growth rates, it would have been overestimated by over 30 percent. For Japan, however, the correct-assumption forecast underestimated the actual demand, while the constant-price-and-highergrowth forecast was close to actual demand. The depletion process is strongly similar under competition and monopoly. Either way, the price trajectory is ever upward. Under some plausible assumptions, the competitive and monopoly patterns are identical, though Gately does not go that far.
Given the theory of mineral economics, the conclusions, both in Gately's paper and in the work of others, are logical. The pre-1973 price, and, in turn, the 1978 price, were unsustainably low. But the impressive consensus of an everlasting upcreep of minerals prices is in really striking contradiction to the facts. Over time, and with few or no exceptions, minerals prices have fallen, not risen. There is something very wrong with a premise of a fixed stock.
I suggest that minerals are inexhaustible or that mineral resources are nonbinding constraints. We will never get to the end of the deposits of oil, gas, coal, and other minerals. We will stop extracting any of them if and when the investment needed to create new inventories (proved reserves) exceeds their expected value. How much will then be left in the ground is unknowable and unimportant.
The economic problem is not with stocks but with the cost of providing flows: gross additions to reserves. But the models ignore incremental costs. The closest that the Gately paper comes is in referring to discovery size. In a given area under given conditions of knowledge, the odds are 272 Dermot Gately 273 that we find the biggest fields first, even by chance, because they are biggest. And we exploit the cheapest first. Life is one long slide from good to bad and from bad to worse.
But diminishing returns have been offset, in fact more than offset, by increasing knowledge. Therefore, the marginal cost and the competitive market price of any mineral, including oil, is the uncertain fluctuating resultant of two strong opposing forces.
If we think in terms of flows, not stocks, three consequences follow. First, mineral production has at least normal risk. Assets do not normally appreciate. Second, if the 1973 pre-embargo price, and then, in turn, the pre-1979 price, had been unsustainably low, we should have seen a steep rise in marginal investment requirements in the OPEC countries before 1973 and continuing through at least 1979. We see nothing of the kind.
One might try to rescue the proposition of increasing scarcity and untenable 1973 prices by invoking user cost, but user cost is simply the present value of the resource used up in production. Holding the asset for future sale is an investment. Development or exploration are alternative investments. Because they are all substitutes, the cost of each is a proxy for the others. Stable development costs, therefore, mean stable exploration and user cost.
The third consequence of thinking in terms of flows, not stocks, and of discarding the false paradigm of ever-rising prices is that the family resemblance between price and production trajectories under monopoly and under competition disappears. Inside OPEC, investment has shrunk radically. Outside OPEC, investment, capacity, and production have all expanded. Because supply depends on investment, any analysis whose key variable is percent of capacity utilized is, at most, of short-run significance. I think we ought to look separately at investment in two or two and one-half sectors. This enormous reserve addition and depletion was no gift of nature, nor was it geologists' conservatism. Investment made the existing fields keep growing as they were exploited, and a great many small fields were discovered. So the notion of a country being at capacity and doomed to run down in the future omits the most basic fact-the inducement to invest to create reserves and capacity.
Contrary to Gately, expenditures outside of OPEC have created large reserve additions. They have been promptly, which is to say, efficiently, used up. But even outside the cartel, there are many areas where higher prices have a tendency to reduce investment, lower prices to increase investment.
Oil as an appreciating asset is a fiction, but belief in the fiction is a fact. During the 1970s, the higher the prices went, the higher they were expected to go. Noncartel governments thought they could benefit by withholding oil and gas for future production. Governments, therefore, demanded impossible terms from foreign oil companies. Others overtaxed or explicitly restrained production and exports. When oil prices declined after 1981, many reversed course, and production rose. It was no accident.
An outstanding example is Canada, which took a stunning capital loss of about 70 percent on the value of the asset exportable gas, which they are now promoting at much lower prices. The lesson is being learned all too slowly: government take is a rent and not a cost.
The notion of non-OPEC output eroding away, with prices in the range of $18 to $22, is illusory. Costs, excluding rents, are lower than that. Not even U.S. output would shrink appreciably, if at all. Output elsewhere would continue to expand. Going now to the cartel nations: because they have short time horizons and high discount rates, they gravitate toward a policy of "take the money and run." They are too quick for their own good to raise prices and too slow for their own good to lower them. Relations are dominated by larger versus smaller. Small is beautiful. The small members cheat readily, knowing that the others will cover for them, but the buck stops with the largest. If he cheats, the agreement collapses. But he cannot afford to become everybody's favorite patsy; hence, the endless game of chicken: threats, then action to make the threats good.
History repeats itself, but with some significant differences. In January 1983 Saudi Arabia broke up an OPEC meeting. Within two months the rest of the cartel had agreed to quotas to which they adhered for a time. In November of 1985, the Saudis began to sell their full quota by discounting without limit, the so-called netback system. As in 1983, they got their way, but this time it took nine months, many meetings, and a price decline of 50 percent. The Saudis did gain because they had almost nothing to lose at the outset. One is tempted to say that another such victory and they are all finished, but I think not.
Where do we go from here? The cartel appears to have a perceived ceiling that is in the neighborhood, roughly, of $25. If they can hold to the current level, some halfway between $5 and $25, they will try for more. "Market conditions" and OPEC "capacity utilization" are not important. Both times when prices exploded during the 1970s were periods of slack demand, except when production was deliberately cut to panic the market. Cohesion, or the lack thereof, is all-important.
The cartel is trying to control prices by the control of output. Before some of my wildcatting friends rush back into the oil patch and the Texas legislature relaxes upon learning that the state's $3.5 billion deficit is only temporary, perhaps a bit more caution is in order. My purpose here is not to offer yet another oil price forecast but simply to examine the sensitivity of these conclusions to key underlying assumptions.
The conclusion that the current price decline is a temporary aberration rests on assumptions about the growth of world oil demand, non-OPEC supply, and the behavioral response of the OPEC cartel. Let us consider each in turn. Gately's analysis suggests that the sharp decline in world oil demand in 1980-82 and the stagnant growth thereafter were basically the result of lagged adjustments to oil price increases of the 1970s. Even though modest world gross domestic product growth from 1981 to 1985 tended to increase oil demand, lagged price effects more than offset this tendency. With demand having fully adjusted to the price increases of the 1970s, a resumption in oil demand growth should be evident in the late 1980s and the 1990s as world GDP expands and the effects of the real price decline since 1981 are felt. While one might quibble about how robust this demand growth will be, depending on long-run price and income elasticities of demand, it seems clear that Gately's analysis is robust to a variety of plausible ranges for such elasticities.
Gately's assumption that non-OPEC production will soon peak and then begin to decline is plausible but subject to a good deal more uncertainty. Even if prices remain low, I am convinced that the shut-in of existing fields within the United States will not result in the large production losses estimated by various industry groups.3 Also, large gas reserves could enable the Soviets to expand oil exports by 3 to 4 million barrels a day by substituting natural gas for oil domestically. Particularly if oil prices stabilize at $20 or more, Gately's conclusion may not hold. Rather than belabor such issues, let us move on to a more critical assumption.
With either constant or declining non-OPEC production, OPEC will be the sole beneficiary of a growing demand for oil. The behavioral assumption I would like to examine more closely is how growth in the demand for OPEC oil translates into oil price increases. It was Gately, Kyle, and Fischer who first argued that OPEC is likely to eschew dynamic wealth optimization models in favor of "rule of thumb" pricing.4 Because of its practicality, most models followed their suggestion and adapted simple price adjustment rules based on the degree of capacity utilization facing OPEC. Price determination in both Gately's model and in the Energy Information Agency model used by Hogan and Leiby adopts similar adjustment equations tied to the ratio of OPEC production to capacity. This feature is also embedded in nine of the ten models surveyed in the Energy Modeling Forum's comparison of world oil models. For the EMF analysis, OPEC capacity was held immutably at 34 million bpd-roughly equal to today's installed capacity. In Gately's latest simulations, he projects OPEC capacity at both 25 million bpd and 35 million bpd.
With capacity assumed to be exogenously determined, demand for OPEC oil rises to capacity, and prices are allowed to increase sufficiently to hold production within this capacity constraint. The rate at which price then increases depends on short-and long-run price elasticities of non-OPEC supply, demand, and the elasticity of oil demand with respect to economic activity. Note that in Gately's figure 8, at one point or another prices begin rising sharply, ultimately reaching a $55-to-$60-abarrel price range by the year 2000. Given the capacity constraint, it is not surprising that models uniformly project real oil prices far in excess of the 1980 price peak.
It would seem that the most critical determinant of future oil prices is the exogenously determined OPEC capacity limits. Yet, little if any justification is given for such limits. In the EMF survey, 34 million bpd was chosen as capacity presumably because it coincided with 1981 installed capacity. But productive capacity has nothing to do with the constraints imposed by the underlying resource base. Known reserves in most OPEC countries would permit production rates many times current installed capacity: all that is needed is additional wells, pipelines, and loading terminals. In most OPEC countries, installed capacity is readily expandable because of the high potential production rates of individual wells. Morris Adelman has shown that at a marginal cost of $5 a barrel, OPEC could expand productive capacity to 60 million bpd based entirely on known reserves.S Because estimates of potential undiscovered reserves in these countries are quite large, such a rate could probably be sustained for a substantial period.
If current capacity in OPEC countries is not effectively constrained by the magnitude of the resource base, by technical limitations, or by costs of capacity expansion, then OPEC decisionmakers are truly unconstrained in their capacity choice. But if this is true, why should they choose to maintain productive capacity at 1970 levels? Admittedly, installed OPEC capacity has not changed appreciably over the past fifteen years, but is this sufficient justification for holding it fixed immutably for the next fifteen years? One could argue that over the past 5. M. A. Adelman, "The Competitive Floor to World Oil Prices," Energy Journal (forthcoming).
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fifteen years, OPEC countries had little reason to expand capacity. When production approached capacity, as in the late 1970s, OPEC countries simply raised prices instead of expanding capacity. At the time, there was little fear of driving price too high. Since then, falling demand has left OPEC production at only a fraction of capacity, providing little reason for expansion. But in the future as resumed demand growth pushes production up against existing capacity, will OPEC again choose to raise price rather than capacity as implied by the models of Gately and others? This amounts to assuming that the OPEC cartel will change very little both in membership and in behavioral characteristics.
I find such an assumption highly implausible. My own research indicates that OPEC is a partial market-sharing cartel rather than a dominant-firm type cartel in which one member, Saudi Arabia, or a few producers act as the residual supplier and other OPEC members behave competitively.6 With the exception of Iraq, Gabon, and Ecuador, OPEC members tend to raise and lower productionjointly, with some members absorbing larger percentage production cuts than others. Because market-sharing behavior is the weakest type of cartel arrangement, the past may be little guide for the future. There are several reasons to expect intra-OPEC dissension.
First, the legitimacy of a cartel member's market share is likely to become blurred, especially after upheavals such as the Iran-Iraq war, the cessation of which will require a major reallocation of market shares if Iran and particularly Iraq, as is likely, expand production significantly.
Second, long-term interests among OPEC countries are varied. Small producers tend to prefer competitive behavior; those with huge resource bases prefer a low price-high output strategy. For example, many OPEC observers, including Gately, interpret the production increases by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates in 1986 as a means of reducing price and disciplining cheaters within the cartel. As shown in my quarter of 1985, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Core, excluding Libya, attempted to regain a market share merely in line with their earlier experience. The result was of course the price collapse of 1986. The Core countries were acutely aware that at the very low production rates of 1985, the present value of their vast reserves was greatly diminished. I disagree with Gately's conclusion that for price below $12, output reductions by Saudi Arabia and other Core members would be irrational. Gately's claim is that with price above $12 even the Saudis face an inelastic short-run demand and have incentives to cut production unilaterally, while with lower prices they lose revenue by cutting output further. But his conclusion overlooks both the game-theoretic aspect and the long-run elasticity of demand implications behind the Saudi strategy. To the contrary, I would argue that barring military intervention, the Saudi ploy was a no-lose gambit. If the price drop succeeded in Table 1. (continued)   1983  1984  1985  1986  Percent  change,  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2 William Nordhaus observed that one clear message of the paper and discussion was the importance of market structure assumptions for predicting the oil price path. The competitive price suggested by Adelman was somewhere in the range of $5 to $10 a barrel. A price between $10 and $20 might be the present-value maximizing price for the Core producers. And if the oil-producing countries simply pick a fixed quantity of output as appropriate, prices could be much higher. In considering future prices, Nordhaus argued the need to stress the inherent indeterminacy of oil prices in the medium run; they could be anywhere between $5 and $100 by the mid-1990s. That indeterminacy reflects the uncertainty about what market structure will prevail, together with very low shortrun demand and non-OPEC supply elasticities. Nordhaus concluded that we should expect tremendous volatility in oil prices in the coming years. In his view, the confidence band attached to most oil price projections is far too narrow.
Charles Holt suggested that institutional analysis of the actors involved in the oil market might yield better price projections than supply and demand analysis. Nordhaus added that some of the best analyses of the oil market during the 1970s and early 1980s were done by the CIA's Middle East experts.
Glenn Hubbard noted that while horizontal market structure is key to long-run price determination, vertical market structure has a significant influence on short-run price determination. The oil industry has moved from reliance on vertical integration and long-term contracts to reliance on short-term contracts and spot-market transactions. An active oil futures market has also developed. As a result, forecasts of short-run price paths now ought to take full account of the prices in futures markets. Philip Verleger estimated that spot trade currently accounts for between 50 and 75 percent of daily oil consumption, substantially eliminating arbitrage between markets. European and U. S. markets used to follow each other closely, but at one point last year, Verleger continued, Arab light oil was selling for $12 on the U.S. Gulf Coast and for $20 in Europe. Given high transportation costs, local price volatility attributable to short-run discrepancies in supply availability across markets will continue, absent changes in market structure.
